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moventibus quae movendo non alterantur; quia talis motus nihil consumit
de potentia eorum: unde non minori tempore movere possunt, postquam
aliquo tempore moverunt, quam ante; sicut solis virtus finita est, et quia in
agendo eius virtus activa non minuitur, infinito tempore potest agere in
haec inferiorea secundum naturam." The arguments quoted from Averroes
in the same chapter are also interesting in this connection as indicating that
they discussed the question on all sides, and the final outcome was a matter
of opinion rather than of originality.

The latter part of note 157, on p. 99 seems to me to base a comment of
doubtful logic on a corrupt reading. Assuming that Crescas does read
"matter" instead of "sense," as Gersonides has it, it would have nothing
to do with matter as the principle of individuation, for the matter which
individuates is that of the object and not of the subject. And in so far as
it may be said that matter can only be perceived by matter, this is indicated
alike in Crescas and Gersonides when they speak of a "hylean power." To
call this hylean power, matter and imagination makes no sense. The
truth is that the reading in Crescas is corrupt, and should read "sense"
instead of "matter." In the Ferrara edition the reading is "hachomer,"
which looks like an abbreviation of "hachomér" = matter. It is really a
corruption for "hachush" = sense, as in note 172 on p. 108 of Dr. Wax-
man’s book, where sense and imagination are similarly joined, as being the
sources of our knowledge.

ISAAC HUSIK.

Dodi Ve-Nechdi (Uncle and Nephew), the Work of Berachya Hanakdan.
By HERMANN GOLLANCZ. Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1920.—
pp. xxii, 161 (English part), 59 (Hebrew part).

The work before us is of slight or no interest to the student of mediæval
philosophy, but it has its value for the historian of mediæval science. The
basis of the book is the "Quaestiones Naturales" of Adelard of Bath,
who lived in the eleventh and twelfth centuries, and was among the first
scholastic writers who drew his information from Arab sources. Berachya
ben Natronai Hanakdan, a Jew who lived in England or France in the
twelfth or thirteenth century, made a Hebrew adaptation of Adelard’s work
for the benefit of Jewish readers.

Prof. Gollancz, the editor of the work, includes in the volume under re-
view, an English translation made by himself of the original Latin of the
Quaestiones, two Hebrew versions of Berachya’s adaptation in the Hebrew
text and English translations of the Hebrew texts. All this is preceded
by an introduction, which discusses in a general way the relation of the
Hebrew to the Latin, gives a description of the Hebrew MSS. used by the
editor, and calls attention to some peculiarities of style and vocabulary of
the Hebrew adapter or translator. There are 76 questions in the "Quaes-
tiones," of which the following are specimens: "Why do not plants spring from water, air or fire as they do from earth?"; "Why do some animals ruminate and others not?"; "Why do some animals see more clearly by night than by day?"; "Why men of good abilities have weak memories, and the converse?"; "How is it that sound is its passage makes its way through any obstacle whatever?"; "Why the fingers are of unequal length?"; "How the globe is supported in the middle of the air?"; "If a hole were made straight through the earth in what direction would a stone project into it fall?", and so on, and so on.

I have not thought it worth while to read the book through, but a glance at some of the answers to the questions seems to indicate that the ideas with which Adelard operates are those Greek notions which are familiar to us from Aristotle and Galen, such as the four elements, the four primary qualities, the four humors of which human and animal bodies are composed, etc., etc. The editor and translator deserves credit for having gone to the trouble of translating and editing these inaccessible texts, which may mean more to the historian of mediaeval scientific notions than to the student of philosophy, mediaeval or otherwise.

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This essay offers a critical analysis of the theories implied in certain typical attitudes toward truth. Although these theories have been only incompletely formulated historically, they are here rounded out into systems of theoretical import with their presuppositions and implications clearly set forth. The author groups the theories under discussion as subjective theories of truth, relational theories and voluntaristic theories. Under the first head, he discusses logical hedonism and the view of truth as "the irresistible"; under the second, the correspondence theory of truth, truth as formal consistency, and truth as coherence in a "significant whole"; and under the final head, he presents the voluntaristic views of a group of thinkers, chief among whom are Royce and Dewey. In estimating these respective theories, the author assumes the validity of four criteria: a satisfactory theory of truth must be self-critical; it must not presuppose any specific metaphysics, psychology or epistemology (although it must 'presuppose ordinary logic'); it must account for falsity; and it must be such that it can be applied. In his treatment of an admittedly difficult problem (for the problem of truth is certainly that) and in his interweaving of exposition and critical argument, Mr. Boas displays considerable mastery and acumen. The subjective theories of truth are rejected, broadly speaking, because they presuppose a sensationalistic psychology and an affective theory